118 Int. J. Diplomacy and Economy, Vol. 2, Nos. 1/2, 2014 EU in the struggle for global governance: geopolitical ethics Igor Kovač EMUNI University, Sončna pot 20, 6320 Portorož, Slovenia E-mail: Igor.kovac@epaneurope.eu Abstract: This article argues in favour of a coherent and active European Union foreign policy based on the idea of ‘geopolitical ethics’. In the first part of the article, the situation of the international system since 1990 is outlined. It seems that after the financial crisis of 2008 the world has lost its global governor – the USA – and thus plunged into a non-polar structure. The second part of the article will present the concept of ‘geopolitical ethics’. Namely, analogical to the personalistic ‘ethics of responsibility’, in which an individual is the primary focus, ‘geopolitical ethics’ considers the nation as the constituent unit in the international system. In the final section, two case studies, both involving the internal (policy making) and external (policy implementation) dimensions of the EU’s grand strategy − ‘geopolitical ethics’, are presented. Keywords: structure of the international system; global governance; EU; foreign policy; power; ethics; geopolitical ethics; nation; personalism; humanitarian intervention; Libya; economic-financial-debt crisis; Cyprus. Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Kovač, I. (2014) ‘EU in the struggle for global governance: geopolitical ethics’, Int. J. Diplomacy and Economy, Vol. 2, Nos. 1/2, pp.118–138. Biographical notes: Igor Kovač is an MAIS graduate from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where he was a Research Assistant with Prof. Dr. Markus Kornprobst. As a Research Fellow at EMUNI University, he has published several articles and books. His field of research are geopolitics, big power relations and the EU. Moreover, he has lectured at the Faculty of Social Sciences (Ljubljana), Graduate School of Government and European Studies (Kranj), International School for Social and Business Studies (Celje), Faculty of Economics and Business (Maribor), and Faculty of Humanities (Koper). 1 Introduction Kissinger (1973) famously said that “Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac”. Power is a love potion not only for politicians, diplomats, and experts, but also for scholars and academia as a whole. It is one of the primary concepts in the theory of international relations. Different theoretical approaches define and perceive power differently, yet it is clear that no international relations theory can afford to neglect the concept of power. Even the popular culture hit ‘Game of Thrones’ depicts this political obsession with power. It is possible for a scholar of international relations to draw some comparisons Copyright © 2014 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. EU in the struggle for global governance 119 between the more memorable lines from the series and the theory of power. Lord Petyr Baelish once said that “knowledge is power”, to which Cersei Lannister replied that “power is power”. The conversation summed up the first debate in the international relations theory – realists vs. idealists. Realists (Cersei) define power as an end in itself and the ability of actor A to make actor B do things that the latter would not otherwise do [Dahl, (1957), pp.202−203]. Idealists (Baelish) see power as a measure of control of the outcomes, in which the power of non-decision making is crucial. For idealists, power is used by actors to limit the scope of discussion in international organisations, thus the actors control the outcomes (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Lord Varys’s idea that “power resides where men believe it resides” would have struck a chord with the believers of constructivism, the third major school of thought in international relations, as it goes in line with Wendt’s (1992) famous article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. Thus, power is also what states make of it. In this article the definition of power is not as important as the undisputed notion that power matters in both the theory and practice of international relations. Yet, what is peculiar about the article is that it puts ethics alongside power as the second essential arché of phenomena in international affairs. There is a constant academic debate about the role of ethics in politics. The mentioned theories deal with this question differently – realism is rather reserved towards the role of ethics in politics (Niebuhr, 2008), idealism sees ethics as a strong source of action [Amstutz, (2005), p.57], and constructivism perceives ethics as a component of agency in international relations (Price, 2008). Unlike typical academic works that embrace either power or ethics as the sole underlying principle of international relations, this article argues for a fusion between the two to form ‘geopolitical ethics’. One of the good examples of the dichotomy between power and ethics are human rights. Following ethics exclusively, the individual is put in the mainstream of international law and international relations – forging the concepts of ‘human development’ and ‘human security’ [Benedek, (2011), pp.82−83]. On the other hand, solely following power, human rights become secondary issue in international relations, becoming only relevant within the scope of national security [Benedek, (2011), pp.82−83]. The article is bridging the gap between the two approaches and presents a third way of understanding human rights in international relations – through the nation. It presents the interwoven relations between ethics and power for a new understanding of human rights, foreign policy, diplomacy and economy. To portray this logic, the article will analyse the European Union in the earthly ‘Game of Thrones’. Firstly, the playing field – the constellation of world power after the end of the Cold War – will be described. Secondly, a new vision and strategy to help the EU become the next global governor, ‘geopolitical ethics’, will be introduced. Finally, two examples that demonstrate both the internal challenge of accepting such a grand strategy and the external challenge of implementing such a vision will be presented (humanitarian intervention in Libya and financial crisis in Cyprus). 2 Struggle for global governance As stated in the introduction, the fight for global governance is a constant element in international relations. During the Cold War, there were two vast opposing systems 120 I. Kovač competing with each other. What happened when the Iron Curtain fell? Who has been the global governor since? Who were the most important players in the new international system? After the end of the Cold War, three ideas emerged in the academic world and all of them sought to explain the new nature of the international system: unipolarity, multipolarity, and the ‘new world order’. The idea of a unipolar world follows the simple arithmetic that 2 minus 1 equals 1. Therefore, after the bipolar Cold War, the world should be unipolar with the US assuming the role as the sole global governor. Krauthammer (1990/1991) is a key author in this school of thought, who in 1990 wrote an article titled ‘The unipolar moment’. The second grand idea, multipolarity, suggests that due to what was later termed the ‘rise of the rest’ and the decline of US power, the global system would be multipolar again. One of the key figures who had this vision was John Mearsheimer. He drew a parallel between the future of the Great Powers and the experience of Europe in the early twentieth century (Mearsheimer, 1990). ‘New world order’ advocates believe that the world will go through a paradigmatic shift, after which democracy, peace, and economics would prevail over classical military-based power relations. The state’s role would vanish and international organisations and economic entities would become the main actors of international relations. Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man epitomises this school of thought. Looking back with the benefit of hindsight, one can conclude that all three ideas were partially right but were insufficient (Gaiser and Kovač, 2012). Since the Soviet Union dissolved, the US has become the focal point of every geopolitical analysis. However, the US did not find the answer to the question ‘what to do with its primacy’ (Art, 1991) until 2000. The US needed time to fully understand the new situation in international relations [Kissinger 1994, p.809]. Due to US reluctance to take advantage of its unique role in the early 1990s, the world was not unipolar, as it would have been if the US had exercised its full power potential, but multipolar. Yet this multipolartiy was not a function of structural factors, such as US decline and/or the ‘rise of the rest’, but rather of US passivity at a time when it was the most powerful country in the world; thus, it was function of agency factors [Kovač, (2012), pp.81−82]. The US did not take its position of the world’s only hegemonic power and subsequently the world descended into multipolar chaos. As a result of this lack of global governance, (civil) wars and genocides were commonplace and the new rules of international affairs were not set [Gaiser and Kovač, (2012), p.53]. Mearsheimer (2001, pp.58–59) was right when he compared such behaviour to the inter-war period, during which the US retreated into isolationism. The mistake was not repeated after the Second World War, but it was repeated after the Cold War. As attractive as it sounds, Fukuyama’s thesis is also unsatisfactory. It gained much momentum during the G.H.W. Bush administration (Bush’s speech ‘Toward a new world order’ in 1990) as well as the two Clinton terms. Clinton’s ‘trade first’ policy led to the signature, ratification, and implementation of over 300 trade agreements (Clinton, 2000). However, the end of the Cold War did not represent a peaceful acceptance of a capitalistliberal international order since this period also witnessed the rise of new challenges to the existing international order [Kovač, (2012), pp.41−64]. One needs security and stability for trade and economic growth and therefore military power factor cannot be overlooked (Nau, 1995). After the multipolar chaos of the 1990s, the US rediscovered its guiding principle in international affairs. It embraced the concept of unipolarity fully and, with G.W. Bush as EU in the struggle for global governance 121 its new president, began to act as a unipolar hegemon. Condoleezza Rice presented this new vision in her 2000 Foreign Affairs article. Since taking office in 2001, the G.W. Bush administration initiated some significant changes in US grand strategy: it emphasised military preparedness, great-power politics, and concrete national interests [Dueck, (2004), p.523]. Terrorist attacks on September 11 2001 did not change the course of US grand strategy. What had been changed was the attitude of the USA towards Russia and China. Before the attacks Beijing and Moscow were listed as the US’s main adversaries (Rice, 2000). By 2002, as demonstrated in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, both actors became partners of the US in its fight against terrorism. World unipolarity began to crumble in 2006, when the US economy started to show weaknesses (Kovač, 2013), and the results of regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq were rather poor. Friedberg (2009, p.32) warns analysts not to equate ‘power as control over resources’ with ‘power as control over outcomes’. At this stage it was evident that military power alone could not solve all challenges. The US learned that the hard way, and as Jervis (2003, p.86) put it, it is harder to build than to destroy. The G.W. Bush administration realised this and for the second time readjusted its foreign policy strategy outlined in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America in 2006. The lack of desired outcomes in US foreign policy, the decline in US economic power, and the ‘rise of the rest’ all contributed to the shift from a unipolar to a uni-multipolar power structure of the international system. Huntington (1999, pp.35−66) first presented the concept of uni-multipolarity in 1999, when he wrote: “There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. A multipolar system has several major powers of comparable strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns”. Uni-multipolarity is a strange hybrid, a system with one superpower and several major powers. The US is the world’s biggest power, but by 2006 it could not keep the world in a state of unipolarity. Furthermore, other major powers could not yet counter-balance the power of the US, so the world was not multipolar [Kovač, (2012), pp.64−73]. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15 2008, the world entered a financial crisis and the global power structure began to change once more. It seems that the international system shifted from uni-multipolarity to non-polarity. Richard Haass observed that instead of remaining concentrated in a single entity, power became increasingly dispersed, in the world. Thus, he defined non-polarity as (Haass, 2008): “A/ world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. /…/ In contrast to multipolarity − which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power − a non-polar international system is characterized by numerous centres with meaningful power”. In non-polarity, there are many more power centres than in multipolarity, a number of which are not nation-states. Power is now found in many hands and in many places (Haass, 2008). The international system today has many different players that possess considerable amount of power, yet no one can secure the position of global governor. The structure of the post-Cold War world was exceptionally volatile and far from stable. It has shifted several times: from bipolar during the Cold War to multipolar in the 1990s, to unipolar in 122 I. Kovač 2000, to uni-multipolar in 2006, and finally currently we are witnessing yet another reshaping (Kovač, 2012). 3 Geopolitical ethics – the way forward for the EU The main characteristic of the structure of today’s international system is the lack of a global governor. Can the EU be a contender for this coveted position? Regardless of the debt crisis, the EU certainly has the potential to be a more competitive player. As described in the second chapter of this article, there is an ongoing debate in the US about its grand strategy. The EU, on the other hand, lacks a grand strategy of its own; moreover, it lacks the political will for one. Consequently, the EU does not act as a coherent global actor and its potential power is diffused. This internal problem of the EU and the consequences for its grand strategy will be dealt with in examples in the next chapter. Now, this paper will focus on the systemic level and introduce a new foreign policy vision for the EU. The vision presented in this paper is termed ‘geopolitical ethics’. The idea draws from France Bučar’s system theory and applies it to a grand strategy of the EU. Essentially the vision argues for an EU hard power build-up that is fused with ethical principles. Thus, the EU would be obliged, for example, to prevent genocides, which is only possible through the combination of economic, military, political, and cultural power factors. Bučar (2003a) is a great critic of positivism. However, his system theory does not exclude the quantitative aspects of science and politics, as non-positivistic scholars do. Bučar’s system theory combines quantity and quality approaches and considers both agency and structure to be equally important (Bučar, 2003a, 2006) – making his theory post-positivistic. The individual shapes the system with his deeds, since he governs the system and its sub-systems. Yet the environment of the (sub)system has an influence on the individual as well. Structure shapes not only behaviours but also identities and orientations of agents [Harknett and Yalcin, (2012), pp.502−503]. Neither the system, nor their sub-systems exist in a vacuum: they have to respond and adapt to the environment (Bučar, 2003a, 2006). To put it in international relations rhetoric – Bučar overcomes the ‘agency-structure’ divide. For Bučar, the individual plays a central role in his system theory, as human beings are the only ones that connect and understand both the material world and the world of ideas [Bučar, (2003a), p.34]. Individuality derives from human rationality [Bučar, (2003a), pp.206−210]. Furthermore, he understands the individual through a personalistic philosophy [Bučar, (2003a), p.174]. Therefore, Bučar argues that an individual is not only the essence of his system, but also a cardinal value of the system. Thus, the individual and Bučar’s system combine the logic of material (power) and the logic of idea (ethics). Power and ethics are thus not two components, but their fusion is a new entity, with its own ontology. Bučar does the same with agency and structure – you cannot separate the two, they have to be dealt with as a new coherent unit; similar as supply and demand have to treated in economics – jointly. When analysing sub-system relations, the individual is Bučar’s primary agency level. When considering international relations, due to the hierarchic system theory, Bučar shifts the primary agency from the individual to the nation (Bučar, 2007). The individual is replaced by the nation as a result of a new level of communication between the system and its environment. Still, the individual, because it is a primary agency within the system, indirectly influences the ‘higher agency’ – the nation. Yet, Bučar (2006, p.79) EU in the struggle for global governance 123 also suggests that every decision of a sub-system has to be in accordance with the goals of the system as a whole, especially with regard to core values of this system. Furthermore, national identity is a consciousness about oneself, without it there is no individual and thus no people; without people, there is no culture and no nation [Bučar, (2003b), pp.61−64). The logic also applies in the opposite direction: to disavow a nation would be to disavow an individual [Bučar, (2003a), pp.64–68]. For Bučar, the nation and national identity represent essential values in international relations and a primary agency in the international community. He agrees with Coundenhove-Kalergi [2000 (1923), p.71]: “Every nation is a sanctuary – as the hearth and home of culture, as the point of crystallization for morality and progress”. The nation meets ethics and power criteria. Bučar (2003c, p.58) argues that natural systems either expand, or they perish – logic of power. Only because of the existence of ethics are the systems able to resist expansion at the expense of each other in order to coexist. Only ethics can check the egoistic logic behind power relations [Bučar, (2003c), p.58]. Values and ethics give sense to coexist. As it is not ethical to murder a person in inter-personal relations, it is likewise unethical to extinguish nations in international relations. Even more, it is ethical responsibility to preserve an individual in inter-personal relations and nation in international relations, since every person/nation is a value on its own. In short, Bučar believes that personalistic philosophy can be applied to the international arena. Nevertheless, in both cases (inter-personal and inter-national), one needs power to act ethically. An individual needs power to prevent a murder and a nation needs power to prevent genocide. The ethics in and of itself is insufficient, since its utility is rather minimal. To act, one need to be aware of limitations and capabilities, which are related to power. Fusing ethics with the concept of power is in this paper referred to as ‘geopolitical ethics’. Geopolitics is a symbol of power and space (material, real, applicable and structural), whereas ethics is a symbol of ideas and values (agency). Power gives ethics the action and political application it needs and ethics gives power its value. With regard to ethics, one should reject the notion of relativity. There are absolute values and ethical norms common to all humans and nations – the concept of world ethos (Küng, 2008). Moreover, for some human rights cultural relativity is not applicable – genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, to name just the most detestable. When discussing power and ethics in international relations, since the early days of this science, the concept of national interest has personified egoistic actions for gaining power in the international community. Combining power and ethics creates a hierarchical order between ‘geopolitical ethics’, national interest, and morality, where national interest gains a positive connotation. At the bottom of this hierarchy is morality. Morality, the application of profounder ethics in real life, comes into play when an agency (nation) in international relations wishes to implement a goal which is in accordance with its (national) interest, yet distinguishable from it [Oppenheim, (1998), p.89]. Therefore, the implementation of (national) interest does not require moral judgment [Oppenheim, (1998), p.88]. Another case of moral judgment is also possible: when (national) interest of the entity in international affairs may be reached using different measures [Oppenheim, (1998), p.119]. Above morality lies national interest. Primary national interest is the survival of the nation [Kissinger, (1977), p.204]. Therefore, a nation must do everything in its power to secure its continued existence. Other aspects of national interest vary from nation to 124 I. Kovač nation and are a function of a particular nation’s history, culture, ideology, religion, language, geography, politics, national strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, capabilities, and limitations. A nation has to define its national interest through a thorough geopolitical analysis. However, while a nation defines its national interest, not only power maximisation but also ethics is taken into consideration. National interest is thus superior to morality but inferior to ‘geopolitical ethics’. The logic of egoistic power is fused with the idea of the world ethos to create an operational stew from which every nation can take its ladle to feed its own definition of national interest. So what is this ‘geopolitical ethics’ strategy of the EU, and how does it differ from other similar visions? First, there is the suggestion that the EU can act as a ‘civil power’ in world politics. The idea was presented by Duchêne (1973). According to Duchêne (1973, pp.19−20), civil powers require specific means and ends; because they are strong economically and weak military; and so they have an interest in trying to domesticate relations between states. Civil powers use civil means for civil goals. If the civil goals (international cooperation, solidarity, strengthening the rule of law, responsibility for the global environment, equality, justice, and tolerance) are indeed a part of ‘geopolitical ethics’, then ‘geopolitical ethics’ cannot be bounded to the use of non-military civil means only. The EU, since the Saint Malo process in 1998 and the start of the Common Security and Defiance Policy (CSDP), has definitely moved away from a vision of civilian power. Civilian power is only one of the many aspects of the idea of ‘geopolitical ethics’, which is broader in terms of means and goals. The concept of civilian power overlooks the importance of the military power in today’s international relations. Every great power needs considerable military capabilities. Second, the EU as normative power. Already Carr (1946, p.108) described the power over opinion; Galtung (1973, p.33) outlined the power of ideas or ideological power, and finally Manners (2002, p.240) wrote about the power to shape the concept of normal. All of these theses seek to explain what normative power means, and by their definitions, it seems certain that the EU possesses such power as it serves as a model for regional cooperation for the rest of the world. Yet, normative power is only another aspect of ‘geopolitical ethics’. Again, the latter is far broader in both goals and means; it argues not only for a ‘role model’, but for an active role of the EU in the international system. Third, there is the idea of the EU as a soft power. States that possess soft power are able to establish a structure of narrative and behaviour that other states are willing to follow. In turn, states with soft power are able to influence the overall structure of the international system. Nye (1990, pp.153–171) defines soft power as a subtle power of cooptation. A state’s soft power is similar to parents raising their children and giving them certain patterns of behaviour [Nye, (1990), pp.153−171]. It influences the deeds and standpoints of other states not by force, as hard power would suggest, but by more subtle measures such as culture and ideology [Nye, (1990), pp.153−171]. Again, the EU possesses these ‘weapons of mass attraction’ (Friedman, 2002). Nevertheless, ‘geopolitical ethics’ demands from the EU to use hard power as well. Fourth, the idea of a transatlantic alliance between the US and the EU. If USA seems to be the epitome of a hard power and Europe the embodiment of a soft power [Cooper, (2004), p.167], it would seem logical that these two big players should join forces and deepen their relationship in NATO (Pelanda, 2007). However, the vision of ‘geopolitical ethics’ is different: the interests and values of the US and the EU may not always overlap. Moreover, the EU is capable of creating its own hard power as well. For example, in EU in the struggle for global governance 125 Afghanistan the EU is accountable for a third of all the soldiers and 40% of total casualties [Drozdiak, (2010), p.11]. To paraphrase the 2003 EU Security Strategy − A Secure Europe in a Better World, the concept of ‘geopolitical ethics’ argues for a ‘Stronger Europe in a safer world’. In the contemporary non-polar structure of the international system, the EU can become the leading actor in international relations. The EU has to build up its economic and military power factors and use it wilfully. The final chapter of this article will examine two examples which would help shed some light on the implementation of ‘geopolitical ethics’. In both case studies, internal disharmony of the EU and external global challenges point to the challenges for the EU and the concept of ‘geopolitical ethics’. Moreover, both examples reflect intertwine relations between diplomacy, economy and human rights. 4 ‘Geopolitical ethics’ in practice This chapter presents two case studies of the application of ‘geopolitical ethics’ as a grad strategy of the EU. As every grand strategy vision of the EU, this one faces two-level challenges as well – internal (getting all the member states on board) and external (how it interacts with other actors in the international arena). The first case study will examine humanitarian intervention or the ‘responsibility to protect’ with a focus on the recent intervention in Libya. The second case study will consider the debt crisis in the Eurozone with a focus on Cyprus. So what exactly is humanitarian intervention? There is no clear legal definition. Yet, it seems there is an academic agreement about its political definition: humanitarian intervention involves the threat and the use of military forces as a key feature. It is an intervention in the sense that a state interferes in the internal affairs of another by sending military forces into the territory or airspace of a sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state and that the intervention is a response to situations that do not necessarily pose direct threats to the intervening state’s strategic interests, but instead is motivated by humanitarian objectives (Frye, 2000). The closest the international community got to a legal definition of humanitarian intervention is through the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, introduced in 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). It states that the primary responsibility of states is the protection of its citizens and this ability redefines states sovereignty as well [ICISS, (2001), pp.XI−XIII]. If a state is not able to provide this protection to its own citizens, it loses its sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another country ceases to apply and gives way to the responsibility of the international community to protect the people of this state [ICISS, (2001), pp.XI−XIII]. Moreover, the responsibility to protect received further recognition and legal status in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document that was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. In points 138 and 139, the document defines responsibility to protect and outlines the procedures for taking action. It was also further clarified by a Report of the Secretary General of 2009. Responsibility to protect encompasses three sets of obligations: the responsibility to prevent (addressing root causes of internal conflicts), the responsibility to react (responding to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures which may include sanctions, 126 I. Kovač prosecutions, or military intervention), and the responsibility to rebuild (providing full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation) [ICISS, (2001), pp.XI−XIII]. Questions of ius ad bellum have been a long-standing in philosophy and politics. So has economic diplomacy, which was given a new impetus after the end of the Cold War [Justinek and Sedej, (2012), pp.80−81] and which is the focal point in the second case study. After the end of the Cold War, economic relations among states became more important than ever. Furthermore, economic power factor became the most important in international relations. Strange (1996, p.189) wrote that power had shifted sideways from states to markets. Other reasons for this change include modern globalisation [Sunkel, (1995), pp.135–136], which in nature is different from its predecessors in the 15th or 19th centuries as the level of integration is much higher today [Nayar, (2005), p.259], the relative increase in the costs of maintaining armed forces and the nature of the military in general (the focus on innovation, high-tech, and R&D), and the fact that economic objectives loom large in the values of post-industrial societies (Keohane and Nye, 2000). Moreover, in today’s financial world, 99% of all transactions belong to the capital account in the balance of payments, but by the end of 1980, the current account (the real economy) still accounted for 95% of global transactions (Kovač, 2013). If we combine this observation with the exponential rise of foreign direct investments (FDI), world global exports, and world GDP after the fall of the Iron Curtain, one can observe that economy and financial sector in particular became force unto itself. In such a new constellation human rights need to be reapplied and ‘geopolitical ethics’ provides a manner for it. Currently the EU and the Eurozone are in a significant economic crisis and the second case study therefore examines whether ‘geopolitical ethics’ can contribute to a better economic outlook for the EU. The former Belgian Prime Minister Mark Eyskens pointedly described the European Community as ‘an economic giant, political mouse, and military worm’ [Eyskens, (1985), p.316]. Politics and economy are two sides of the same coin. The EU faces a crisis that has been caused by the imbalances between its political and economic aspect. The first limps far behind the second. 4.1 Intervention in Libya and ‘geopolitical ethics’ February 26 2011, the UN Security Council (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, 2011b) placed sanctions: an arms embargo against Libya, a freeze on Libyan assets, and a referral of Gaddafi’s crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court in The Hague (Resolution 1970). On March 17 2011, the UN Security Council (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, 2011a) adopted another Resolution (1973), calling the international community to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and populated areas and to impose a ‘marine blockade’ and a ‘no fly zone’ against Libya. The US facilitated this rapid international action and on March 19th led a coalition that launched air and missile strikes against Gaddafi forces. The intervention was a success and may be considered a manifestation of the ‘responsibility to protect’ and humanitarian intervention. In the intervention, NATO coordinated the actions of 18 countries – 14 member states and 4 partners. The US certainly played a crucial role, providing intelligence (75% of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance data employed to protect Libyan civilians and enforce the arms embargo), fuel (75% of the refuelling planes used throughout the mission – without which strike aircraft could not EU in the struggle for global governance 127 have flown near potential targets in order to respond quickly to hostile forces threatening to attack civilians), and targeting capabilities [Daalder and Stavridis, (2012), pp.4−6]. Yet, other countries made similarly indispensable contributions. France and the UK flew over 40% of the sorties and destroyed more than a third of the overall targets between them; Italy provided aircraft for reconnaissance missions and, along with Greece, access to a large number of air bases [Daalder and Stavridis, (2012), p.4]. When it comes to the question of financial commitment, the UK leads with over one billion US dollars spent on the intervention (Hopkins, 2011), the US is second with slightly less than one billion US dollars (Ukman, 2011), closely followed by Italy (Missioni/A Italia Costano 700 Milioni a Semestre Senza la Libia, 2011) and France (Bumiller, 2011). The point is that European states took a substantially bigger share of the military burden than ever before – European intervention and missions in the Balkans had ‘light mandates’ and limited impact (Neuhold, 2010). Moreover, EU member states also took diplomatic initiative – Resolution 1970 was proposed by France, UK, Germany, and the USA. Moreover, France took the lead in proposing Resolution 1973, together with Lebanon and the USA. Up until Resolution 1973, ‘geopolitical ethics’ had been respected by the EU states, all of which supported the sanctions. However, Germany refused to support Resolution 1973, sided with Russia and China, and abstained. It is one thing to refuse to contribute resources towards the intervention, but it is completely another to abstain from such a vote. Diplomatically the German vote meant ‘no’ to intervention in Libya. This action is diametrically opposed to a ‘geopolitically ethical’ action. The German abstention put the cohesion, solidarity, and effectively the CFSP in a rather awkward position: the EU could not act in unison during a significant moment in international affairs. Germany’s decision to abstain has been much debated both internationally and in the EU. The reasons for German inactivity are manifold: elections, Westerwelle’s personal decision, pacifist reflex, and poor strategic thinking (Berenskoetter, 2011). In our discussion with a German Intelligence Officer, another plausible and interesting argument was presented: Germany was unwilling to commit its military forces for fear of getting tangled up in a place and situation similar to Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a good pragmatic argument which has some ground. The September 11 2012 attacks on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi show both the power of radical Islamist militias and the inability of the government in Tripoli to provide security and maintain order across the country. Lawlessness and corruption are pervasive and fundamental questions about the structure and operation of Libyan political and economic institutions remain unanswered [Vandewalle, (2012), p.8]. However, none of this should obscure the fact that developments in post-conflict Libya are surprisingly positive. The larger picture of the country’s transition should still offer hope given that a modern state has, against all odds, started to emerge [Vandewalle, (2012), pp.8−15]. Libyans had little sense of national identity and no experience with democracy. Yet, on July 7 2012, with great determination, Libya held its first national election, which might not have been perfect in every respect, but it was still met with the widespread approval of approximately 27,000 local and international observers [Vandewalle, (2012), pp.8−11]. Moreover, the power of the country’s militias is slowly eroding. Some armed groups have been integrated into national institutions, such as the police and the army, or trained for civilian jobs [Vandewalle, (2012), p.12]. In order to build a Libyan national identity, a commission will draft the country’s post-Gaddafi constitution, which can serve as a social contract for 128 I. Kovač building a coherent state [Vandewalle, (2012), pp.8−13]. The pragmatic German concern that Libya might become a new Iraq has so far not become reality. To save face, Germany increased its involvement in aerial surveillance in Afghanistan [Daalder and Stavridis, (2012), p.4]. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that Germany has many interests in North Africa itself, and like all European powers Germany is interested in maintaining a privileged position in the region, especially in terms of trade and energy security (Rousseau, 2011). Having observed that Libya did not turn into another Iraq, the Germans had to switch positions and started its economic penetration into the energy-rich country. Furthermore, Libya’s economy is not adequately diversified, so its oil sector cannot create enough jobs to put the country’s many unemployed and underemployed youth to work. The country is in desperate need of foreign investment. According to a report by Business Monitor International, Libya’s real GDP is expected to have risen by approximately 59% in 2012, after a roughly 49% drop in 2011 [Vandewalle, (2012), p.14]. Therefore, Libya presents a great opportunity not only for Germany, but also for France, the UK, and Italy. An opposite example to Germany was Italy. Due to its economic interests, Italy supported Gaddafi (Picardi, 2011) for as long as it could diplomatically and politically without damaging its international image. Italy was the only state whose national interest was at stake with the intervention (Giuffrida, 2011). Before the intervention, Italy received 23% of its oil needs from Libya and ENI controlled 15% of Libya’s oil market (Dent, 2011). However, Italy changed its position in due course and became one of the main protagonists of the invasion in order to secure its national interest. One could also argue that France and the UK were so active in the intervention to balance Italian influence in the region. Nevertheless, Italy case is a case of bandwagoning and so does not pose a serious challenge to the ‘geopolitical ethics’ as the German case does. Indeed, energy companies from France and the UK (total and BP in particular) signed new deals in Libya (Borger and Macalister, 2011), while Italy’s ENI returned home in the hope of restoring its position in the country in the future (Gribben, 2011). For Italian companies looking to re-establish themselves in Libya, prospects are positive (Kovalyova and Farge, 2011). It is most likely that ENI’s shares will return to its old level. Nevertheless, it will face increased competition that it has never experienced before the intervention (Dent, 2011). Russia and China are the states which have lost the most because of the intervention and are highly unlikely to be present again in Libya anytime soon (Kovalyova and Farge, 2011). States that did not support the intervention will be faced with a difficulty of persuading the new Libyan authorities that they are trustworthy. One country – Germany – is in a different position. Wintershall for example received a deal for a pipeline (Stephen and Goodley, 2011). How is this possible? European solidarity and ‘geopolitical ethics’ is a potential explanation. One can find both self-interested and ethical reasons within the EU for the intervention in Libya. Thus, the concept of ‘geopolitical ethics’ provides a pertinent framework for better understanding the considerations of EU member states. Unfortunately, Germany, arguably the most important country in the EU, failed to adhere to the vision of ‘geopolitical ethics’ and Italy came in late. Consequently, the EU lost its coherence, the CSDP had a limited effect, and declaratory policies and values were not respected. All of this unfortunately led to the underperformance of the EU as a global actor and moved the EU away from the grand strategy of ‘geopolitical ethics’. With Germany on board, the EU could have been the leader of the coalition. Yet in reality, the intervening EU member states coordinated with the US through NATO. The US was EU in the struggle for global governance 129 ‘leading from behind’ (Cohen, 2011). This is a big internal setback for the idea of ‘geopolitical ethics’. Nevertheless, if one assesses ‘geopolitical ethics’ and the intervention in Libya from an external perspective, one gets a different result. ‘Geopolitical ethics’ as a grand strategy was relatively successful. The EU countries were able to convince Russia and China not to veto the Resolution 1973. Furthermore, it is highly likely that the insignificance of Libya (Patrick, 2011) is not the root cause for not using the veto. When it comes to issues of sovereignty and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, both Russia and China, are very reluctant to support such actions. Thus, it is very unlikely that during the Arab Spring they would deem events in Libya irrelevant. Furthermore, it is really unlikely that they would make a mistake. Various Russian politicians have subsequently argued that they regarded Resolution 1973 as merely providing the UN with the authority to enforce a no-fly zone, rather than the power to launch what they consider to be an all-out war. However, this objection is almost certainly false and it serves as a sort of ‘damage control’. Essentially Russia and China knew that the use of military force was being planned and they also knew that the authority being sought from the UN Security Council was very wide [Eyal, (2012), p.57]. China and Russia did not veto the Resolution 1973 because, as Sir Grant (2012) subsequently observed, they realised that the political pressure and the fact that the Arab League was calling for action (persuaded by the EU member states) meant that it would be politically difficult to block the Resolution. The pressure exerted by some of the EU states in the international diplomatic arena was thus so vast that China and Russia were unwilling to exercise their respective vetoing power. Since it provided desired results (protection of human rights and economic safe-keeping) ‘Geopolitical ethics’ may be the right grand strategy on the systemic level; yet it is the internal (state) level on which the EU must focus and where the implementation of the strategy is shaky. The EU must get its house in order, regroup behind a common policy, and strike decisively with the right means when necessary. This is the main challenge of ‘geopolitical ethics’. Solving this defiance, the vision could prove beneficial also in the future. 4.2 The EU economic crisis and ‘geopolitical ethics’ The sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone has badly upset Europe’s economic recovery from the financial collapse of 2008–2009, the worst economic setback since the Great Depression of the 1930s [Bayne, (2012), pp.4−5]. How has the economic crisis developed and why was the EU’s political and institutional setup so ill-prepared for such a challenge? The Maastricht Treaty in 1992 meant that the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) got the necessary political support and an implementation plan. Moreover the ‘convergence criteria’ which EU member states are required to meet in order to join the Eurozone were listed in the treaty (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992): the country’s inflation rate must be no more than 1.5% higher than the average of the interest rates in the three member states with the lowest inflation rates; the country’s long term interest rates must be no more than 2.0% higher than the average observed in the three member states with the lowest inflation rates; there should be no currency devaluation during the two years preceding the applicant’s admission to the currency union; the member states government budget 130 I. Kovač deficit must be no higher than 3% of its GDP; its government debt-to-GDP ratio must not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year. These criteria were later reconfirmed in the stability and growth pact (SGP) [Council Regulation (EC) NO 1466/97, 1997; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97, 1997]. The aforementioned criteria had a positive and successful impact on EU member states until 2002 (Winkler, 2007; Wyplosz, 2006; Jones, 2003; Asal, 2012), when France and Germany were not willing to abide by these rules. The states’ economies were converging until 2002, when dispersion followed. Thus, in the decade between 1992 and 2002, the EU made a significant step forward towards becoming an ‘optimum currency area’ (OCA). OCA is a Nobel-Prize-winning theory that outlines the conditions under which it would be beneficial to states should they wish share a same currency (Mundell, 1961). In short, a monetary union is preferable when the states have symmetric shocks and business cycles, which can be determined through the following criteria: labour mobility across the region, complete liberalisation of capital transfers, complete wage and price flexibility, fully integrated banking and financial markets, fixed exchange rates, as well as monetary and fiscal policy coordination. However, the EU member states that later formed the Eurozone were not in an OCA when the single currency was introduced. Therefore, the decision on the establishment of the EMU was not economically rational; its main consideration was political − geopolitical. Thus, the solution to the Euro crisis lies not in economics, but in politics. This is an issue that most scholars overlook as they focus narrowly on the economic aspects of the challenge. Most of the criteria of OCA are related to political economy, with fiscal coordination being probably the most obvious case. Fiscal policy is at the centre of the austerity–spending debate. However, none of the economic paradigms perceive it as being relevant to a monetary union. The Keynesian economic paradigm states that fiscal policy needs to be autonomous to compensate for country-specific asymmetric shocks [Winkler, (2007), p.464]. Adherents of the other great school of economic thought – classical, or incorrectly labelled neoliberal in today’s mass media – argue that financial markets, if fully liberalised, should suffice to discipline governments in debt by charging them adequate risk premia. Classical economists believe that it is unnecessary and inefficient for a monetary union to punish unsound fiscal policies of its member states, since such punitive measures, set by politicians, and executed by bureaucrats, would distort the efficiency of the world’s financial markets by sending arbitrary and potentially misleading signals; moreover, the unsound fiscal policies are punished by the financial markets already [Winkler, (2007), p.464]. Given the positions of Keynesian and classical economists, why would everyone still argue for fiscal coordination, especially when there is no economic theory to support that idea? This is because, as already stated, politics and economics are two sides of the same coin. The euro is the only currency in the world without a political sovereignty behind it; which, if it were to exist, could take up responsibility for and provide guidance to the single currency. Therefore, by creating a ‘fiscal union’, the states are in fact forcing themselves to develop a political leadership, or at least to embark upon a path towards such a development. Consequently, the fiscal union would lead to the issuance of an EU-wide bond and subsequently to a true possibility of employing quantitative easing as a policy, which could help economic recovery in the Eurozone. When one explores the potential policy options that surround EU bonds and quantitative easing, one must not forget that the Eurozone needs to reform the European Central Bank (ECB). Unlike the US Federal Reserve, so far the only objective of the EU in the struggle for global governance 131 ECB is to manage inflation (The Maastricht Treaty, 1992), as the bank does not have the mandate to tackle unemployment. This again needs a political rather than an economic solution. Moreover, in order to deal with the debt crisis, the EU had to create new institutions (European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, European Financial Stability Facility, European Stability Mechanism), which could facilitate faster recovery if they were run properly. Institutional reform, regardless of the reasons for it (political, economic), is a political process and, above all, a political challenge. Although potentially a great economic weapon, the euro, due to its lack of political leadership, could not be used in global economic warfare. The euro gained geoeconomic credibility and established itself as a second global currency after the US dollar (Kovač 2013; Asal 2012). Unfortunately, the Eurozone did not make use of this potentially powerful geopolitical tool. For example, the EU could have used the influence of the single currency to establish a European credit rating agency, encourage trade denominated in euros, and promote the euro as a global reserve currency. Here the concept of ‘geopolitical ethics’ comes into play. Using the idea of ‘geopolitical ethics’ the EU can resolve its internal disagreements, which can be summed up in the question: who is to blame for the crisis? One can blame the reckless Greek government spending [McKinsey Global Institute, (2012), p.5), or one can blame the design flaws of euro − encouraging reckless borrowing by keeping Greek long-term interests rates much lower than their short-term counterparts [Bayne, (2012), p.9]. Whatever the case for precipitating the euro crisis the rule pacta sunt servanda, as both a business and ethical standard, must apply to all solutions. The Greeks should not have lied about their macroeconomic data, especially regarding the budgetary criteria [Wyplosz, (2006), p.222], and the Germans should not have allowed Greece to enter. Only after these unproductive discussions on ‘who’s to blame’ have been set aside will the EU be able to start policy and institutional reforms (for instance, a redesign of the ECB and a substantial rise in the EU budget) in order to get the economy back on track and increase the euro’s political influence. In this process, ‘geopolitical ethics’ may be of use again. It is unwise to adhere to an ideology if common sense suggests otherwise. The debate over austerity and stimulus seems to lack this common sense. Wolf (2013) attributes slow recovery in the US and in the EU to an inability to question conventional ideas and perceptions. In both the EU and the US, their respective economic policies have not yielded desired results; yet the entities continued to pursue them for over five years. Consider the case of the EU. Most of its member states witness daily protests against austerity measures. Yet, where can austerity be found? Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP was reduced in only three EU member states (Germany, Malta, Sweden) (Mitchell, 2013). Average government spending in the EU before the crisis was at 44.36% of GDP and in 2012 the corresponding figure went up to 48.05% (Mitchell, 2013). Moreover, average revenue in EU member states today stayed approximately the same compared to pre-crisis levels, due to the extensive borrowing by a number of countries (Eurostat, 2013). Nevertheless, there is no result. Fiscal stimulus did not achieve its professed goals, since the openness of the Eurozone economies meant that any stimulus rapidly moved out of higher risk countries to safer member states such as Germany [Begg, (2012), p.122]. Many Eurozone member states have to do their austerity homework. It is both pragmatic and ethical to do your duty, as painful as it may be, since the alternative is even dimmer. 132 I. Kovač Saying that, one should not toss away Keynesian stimulus approach altogether. Quantitative easing is a rather geopolitical tool of the EMU as an entity. If the EU wishes to play an active role in the world of international finance, it needs a wider set of instruments. In other words, if the euro wishes to become the top world currency in terms of trade and reserves, then there needs to be more euros circulating in the global financial markets, which can only be achieved if the ECB agrees to issue more euros. Meaning ECB should start issuing Eurozone bonds. ‘Geopolitical ethics’ thus narrates to use the solutions that work, are logical and are designed for a particular member state or challenge of the Eurozone. With regard to the economy, one must be pragmatic in order to be ethical. The responsibility of the EU and its member states is to end the current economic crisis as soon as possible and to provide Europeans with a possibility of enjoying a better standard of living. However, there are also limits to pragmatism – human rights. The best example from the euro crisis is the latest bailout in Cyprus. There have been proposals to confiscate a certain percentage (6.75% for smaller and 9.90% for bigger deposits) of deposits in Cypriot banks (Whelan, 2013). The proposal was widely criticised and was exceptionally unpopular with Cypriot voters. Yet the essence of idea was still preserved in a later deal (Smith et al., 2013). Christensen (2013), co-founder and CEO of Saxo Bank A/S, called it awful-blown socialism. This is an infringement of property rights and as stated in the second paragraph of article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): “No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” The Cypriot bailout was notable because the Eurozone imposed losses on bank depositors for the first time. Indeed Cyprus’s enormous Banking system (716% of its GDP) (Benoit, 2013) and its exposure to the Greek crisis, is the cause of the country’s economic woes (Dalton and Fairless, 2013). However, the target of such measures has been the assets owned by non-EU entities. 20% of all deposits in Cyprus banking system are not from the Eurozone (Kirkegaard, 2013). A recent report from the German foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) stated that the main beneficiaries of a rescue of Cypriot banks would be Russian oligarchs, businessmen, and gangsters who have laundered money in Cyprus (Dettmer and Reiermann, 2013). In any case, the precise amount of Russian deposits in Cypriot banks and the structure of such deposits are unknown to EU authorities (Kirkegaard, 2013). It is clear that the proposal’s aim is to exert geopolitical pressure on Russia. Yet, is it worth it? Ethically, the answer would be no as it infringes human rights. Surprisingly, in terms of power-economic relations that tend to be more hawkish, one may also reach the same conclusion: if the suitableness and efficiency of such action is unclear, why pursue it? ‘Geopolitical ethics’ would not support the proposed and implemented bailout in Cyprus. This case study shows that ‘geopolitical ethics’ may be applied not only to security issues, but also to economic ones, over which internal disorder in the EU is greater. Internal bickering among member states hinders the acceptance of a grand strategy for the EU. Moreover, ‘geopolitical ethics’ provides a clear vision to the EU and the euro in the global arena. But until the internal struggles are over in the EU, it is impossible to know whether such a vision can be successful. EU in the struggle for global governance 5 133 Conclusions We have examined the contemporary power structure of the international system, which was very volatile in the last two decades. The article argues that the bipolar Cold War World System switched to multipolarity in the 1990, which turned into unipolarity in 2000, and evolved into uni-multipolarity in 2006. Today the world is in the middle of another change towards non-polarity. In the struggle for global governance the EU needs a vision for its foreign policy, which is currently not clear or even non-existent. The article continues by enthroning ethics alongside power as the second arché of affairs in international community. Therefore, the two underlying principles have been fused and the concept of ‘geopolitical ethics’ has been presented. Moreover, the aim was to present ‘geopolitical ethics’ as a sound concept for the EU grand strategy. ‘Geopolitical ethics’ bridges the realist-constructivist divide and the abyss between material pragmatism of power and utility-lacking idealism of ethics. As both aspects are relevant one must create a new post-positivistic concept, with a new ontology altogether – ‘geopolitical ethics’. In ‘geopolitical ethics’ structure and agency are not two independent variables, but two equal interdependent components of the analytical process. When changing one the other follows adequately. Furthermore, ‘geopolitical ethics’ enables us to surpass the dichotomy between two different approaches to human rights – individual and state oriented. Namely, it installs the nation, instead of an individual or a state, as the focal agency of human rights on the systemic level. Doing this international affairs are personified and at the same time do not lose their strategic aspect. Personalistic philosophy and ethics of responsibility are transformed from the interpersonal level to the international level and merged with power-politics. The article assesses ‘geopolitical ethics’ as the EU grand strategy with two case studies – humanitarian intervention in Libya and the response to the recent economic crisis in Cyprus. The two examples reflect the interwoven relations between politics (diplomacy), economy and human rights. As it is not ethical to kill an individual in interpersonal relations, so it is unethical to kill a nation in international relations. The EU more or less committed to this fact and to the ‘geopolitical ethics’ begun a political (diplomatic) offensive and latter contributed a vast amount of military work in intervention in Libya. On the other hand, the case of the economic crisis and dealing with the Cyprus question shows that the EU is far from embracing the vision of ‘geopolitical ethics’. For the past five years encounter with the crisis has been inapt. The absence of self-reflection and the perpetual ‘blame game’ among the member states make the EU refuse the adherence to the vision of ‘geopolitical ethics’; moreover, any vision in general. This is not only unethical, but also unproductive in terms of power relations. In both case studies, the internal challenge to the vision of ‘geopolitical ethics’ is greater than the external one; meaning that getting the member states to embrace this common vision is more difficult than achieving success through its application in international affairs. EU’s assertive diplomatic actions, economic recovery, capability and willingness to enter the global ‘Game of Thrones’ are therefore questionable. The EU reminiscences on Ned Stark; and we all know what happens to Starks. 134 I. Kovač Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Jeremy Poon for his help and comments. 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